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Dear Editors,
An interesting editorial1 published in 
Revista Brasileira de Epidemiologia ad-
dresses the threat of an influenza pandemic 
and mentions “the information technology 
that makes it possible to monitor the dis-
tribution of new cases in real time”. We are 
aware that the risk of spread of an emerg-
ing infectious disease from one country to 
another depends on the number of travelers 
and on the ability of the monitoring system 
to detect infected passengers. In this letter, 
we describe a quantitative methodology 
to estimate the risk of introduction of an 
emerging infectious disease into a disease-
free country through the movement of 
persons between countries in international 
flights. Our aim is to contribute to the dis-
cussion about the importance of factors that 
influence the spread of influenza and other 
emerging diseases.
Let us suppose that n travelers depart 
from country A to country B, each of which 
with a probability p of being infected by an 
emerging infectious disease occurring in A. 
The proportion of infected persons (popu-
lation prevalence) in A would give a rough 
estimate for probability p. An additional 
assumption is that the probability p that a 
passenger is infected does not depend on 
the probability that another passenger gets 
infected in the country of origin. Approxi-
mately, there is a probability (1 – p)n that all 
n persons are not infected. Therefore, the 
probability of introduction of at least one 
infected person in the destination country B 
may be estimated as 1 – (1 – p)n. This would 
be the risk of disease introduction in the 
absence of an active surveillance system to 
detect disease.
Assuming that it is possible to estimate 
a sensitivity Se and a specificity Sp for the 
surveillance system in the airport customs, 
then the probability of introduction of a 
healthy (true negative) person is equal to the 
negative predictive value, NPV. That is, the 
probability of introduction of n healthy per-
sons is (NPV)n. Hence, the probability of in-
troduction of at least one infected person is
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Similar approaches to the model presented here have been applied to data for severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)2 and to risk assessment for animal import3. To illustrate 
the usefulness of this method, Figure 1 shows the results of some calculations using the 
above equation for p = 10-6, Sp = 1.0, and some values of Se. The risk of disease introduction 
increases as n increases, and decreases as Se increases. Note that, for Sp < 1.0 or for values 
of Se lower than those used in the calculations, risk estimates would be even greater than 
the values observed in Figure 1.
It is difficult to obtain a reliable estimate of p in a timely manner. We assume that, based 
on data on the previous occurrence of similar diseases and/or on expert opinion, it is pos-
sible to estimate an upper bound for the probability p of a traveler being infected (worst 
scenario). We then may estimate the risk of introduction of at least an infected person 
quantitatively, on the basis of the influx of travelers from another country. 
It is possible to extend the preceding equation to estimate the risk considering the 
influx of passengers from several countries, by multiplying (NPV
i
)ni for each country i and 
subtracting the result from 1, obtaining 
in which n
i
 (i = 1, 2, …) is the number of travelers arriving from a country with prevalence 
p
i
 (i = 1, 2, …).
The sensitivity of a surveillance system may be estimated based on the number of 
non-detected infected persons (i.e. false negatives) entering the country during recent 
pandemics, such as the influenza virus A (H1N1) 4. The disease incubation and infectious 
Figure 1 – Probability of disease introduction for p = 10-6, Sp = 1.0, and different values of  Se 
(numbers over the lines), as a function of the number of passengers.
Figura 1 – Probabilidade de introdução da doença para p = 10-6, Sp = 1,0, e valores diferentes de Se 
(números sobre as linhas), como uma função do número de passageiros.
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periods are factors that affect the sensitivity of the surveillance system. False positives 
(e.g., persons infected with diseases with similar symptoms) may be detected, resulting in 
a certain specificity. Estimates for the sensitivity and specificity of screening tests, such as 
thermal scanners used in airports, will probably be available in the future.
Given estimates for Se and Sp, the risk will be a function of the expected number of 
travelers arriving in a period. Estimates for the risk of disease introduction may help public 
health officials to decide whether or not to screen passengers arriving at the beginning of 
an outbreak. Furthermore, depending on Se and Sp, screening tests may lower the risk of 
an early introduction of a higher number of infected persons.
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